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Gender Bias Toward Status Offenders: A




At fourteen years old, Carmen has a warrant issued for her
arrest.' Carmen has not committed any crime. 2 Instead the juve-
nile court issued the warrant based on allegations that she ran
away from a shelter and engaged "in illicit sex."3 Carmen's mother,
unable to deal with Carmen's boyfriends and sexual behavior,
begged the juvenile court to exercise its authority and change Car-
men's behavior.4 Carmen's mother wants the state to become re-
sponsible for her daughter. 5 A judge agreeing with Carmen's
mother, could order Carmen to reside in a secure facility for an in-
definite period of time.6 Under the 1980 "valid court order" amend-
ment7 to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of
1974 (JJDPA)8 a judge may incarcerate Carmen even though she
has not committed a criminal act.
This article examines the 1980 amendment to the JJDPA and
the amendment's effect on female status offenders. 9 Part I of the
article explores the history of paternalism toward children and wo-
men and the restrictions on female sexuality. It also examines the
traditional rehabilitative and punitive roles of the juvenile courts
* B.A., Psychology, University of Minnesota; J.D., expected, University of Min-
nesota, 1995.
1. Lynn Smith, A Mother Discovers the System Doesn't Work for Runaways, L.A.





6. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12XA) (1988) (codifying Act of Dec. 8, 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-509, § 11(a)(13), 94 Stat. 2757).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-780 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
9. Status offenses are acts committed by juveniles that would not be criminal if
committed by an adult. BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JVVENILE JUSTICE
(3rd ed. forthcoming 1994). Examples of status offenses include running away from
home and truancy. Id. This article will analyze the JJDPA in terms of its effect on
juveniles who commit status offenses.
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and how these roles relate to paternalism. Part II examines the
forces behind the enactment of the "valid court order" amendment
and the amendment's impact on status offenders. Part III identifies
judicial discretion available through the "valid court order" amend-
ment and the relationship of paternalism to judicial discretion. It
also discusses problems with the punitive aspects of the amend-
ment. Finally, Part IV proposes changes to the present juvenile
system that would limit the discriminatory effect of the JJDPA on
female status offenders.
I. PaternalismlO Toward Female Status Offenders: An
Historical Overview
A. Paternalism Toward Children
The paternalistic treatment of status offenders has deep socie-
tal roots." Throughout history, society has viewed children as the
property of their parents.12 In ancient times, men increased their
wealth by appropriating "as property.... children, to be worked,
traded, married off, or sold as slaves, as the case might be."13 Ro-
man society treated children as chattels. 14 American colonial law
10. For the purposes of this article the word "paternalism" refers to the definition
provided by Gerda Lerner:
Paternalism, or more accurately Paternalistic Dominance, describes the
relationship of a dominant group, considered superior, to a subordinate
group, considered inferior, in which the dominance is mitigated by
mutual obligations and reciprocal rights. The dominated exchange
submission for protection, unpaid labor for maintenance. In its
historical origins, the concept comes from family relations as they
developed under patriarchy, in which the father held absolute power
over all the members of his household. In exchange, he owed them the
obligation of economic support and protection. The same relationship
occurs in some systems of slavery; it can occur in economic relations,
such as the padrone system of southern Italy or the system used on
some contemporary Japanese industries. As applied to familial
relations, it should be noted that responsibilities and obligations are
not equally distributed among those to be protected: the male
children's subordination to the father;s dominance is temporary; it lasts
until they themselves become heads of households. Daughters can
escape it only if they place themselves as wives under the dominance/
protection of another man. The basis of 'paternalism' is an unwritten
contract for exchange: economic support and protection given by the
male for subordination in all matters, sexual service and unpaid
domestic service given by the female.
GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARcHY 239-40 (1986) (emphasis in original).
11. For a more detailed discussion of this concept see id.
12. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer
and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992) (analyzing
critically the history of two American constitutional case law lynchpins, its founda-
tions and current effects).
13. LERNER, supra note 10, at 215.
14. Woodhouse, supra note 12, at 1044.
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regarded children as "assets of paternal estates in which fathers
had a vested interest."15 The child welfare debate in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries demonstrated a continued be-
lief in children as chattels.16 This view of children continued even
after the patriarchal family structure slowly began to deteriorate.17
By the end of the nineteenth century, married women had become
legal entities, and policy-makers increasingly viewed children as in-
dividuals and subjects of public concern.' 8 Nonetheless, the notion
that children are the property of men remained in the culture, stat-
utes, and judicial opinions. 19
As patriarchs lost power, the judiciary assumed the role of
guardian. 20 Using their discretion, judges rewrote laws governing
rights and duties within the home and between family members. 2 1
As one commentator aptly noted, "Uludges were the new kinds of
patriarchs, ones invested with a power over some domestic rela-
tions that rivaled that of their predecessors." 22 The judiciary per-
petuated patriarchal models of family governance and continued to
treat children as property; chattels to be possessed, transferred,
and protected by adults.
B. Paternalism Toward Women
History is similarly replete with examples of society's pater-
nalistic attitude toward women. Females were viewed first as the
property of their fathers, 23 and after marriage, as the property of
their husbands.24 Case law reveals that in order to maintain
women's value as property, men sought to preserve women's
chastity. 25
Ancient laws restricted female sexual behavior, thereby pro-
tecting male property interests. Adultery laws provide an example
15. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 25 (1985).
16. Woodhouse, supra note 12, at 1065.
17. Id. at 1047.
18. Id. at 1039.
19. Id. at 1040 ("Patriarchal ideals and structures that treated the child as prop-
erty of the parent continued to exist side-by-side with Lockeian theories of individual
liberty.... ").
20. GROSSBERG, supra note 15, at 300.
21. Id. at 290.
22. Id.
23. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
24. Gena Corea, The Reproductive Brothel, in MAN-MADE WOMEN 38, 42 (1987).
25. See, e.g., State v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 167-68 (1984) ("Rape statutes his-
torically applied only to conduct by males against females, largely because the pur-
pose behind the proscriptions was to protect the chastity of women and thus their
property value to their fathers or husbands.").
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of this kind of restriction. The Bible is the first known legal source
prohibiting adultery.26 Originally, adultery laws forced females to
remain chaste in order to preserve the system of male patriline-
age.2 7 Adultery was seen as a crime against the husband, because
the "unfaithful" wife could potentially bear another man's child.
This potential, in turn, created the possibility that another man's
child would inherit the family property. Given that men could more
easily escape detection should their extramarital affair result in an
offspring, the ban on extramarital sex subjected adulterous women
to far more punishment and social disgrace than their male coun-
terparts.28 The Puritans brought adultery laws to America, and en-
sured strict enforcement. 29
Even today, after significant changes in the public's attitudes
about sexuality,30 fornication and adultery laws still exist in
many states.31 In Minnesota, for example, a statute condemning
adultery, characterized as a crime against the family, remains
in effect. 32 These laws not only bring into the twentieth century
ancient notions of women as property, they operate to continue
blatant sexism and discrimination.33 Although these laws are
26. Exodus 20:14 (Seventh Commandment); Leviticus 20:10; Deuteronomy 22:22;
see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6, at 430 n.1 (1980) (noting that modem adultery
prohibitions "derive from Biblical sources").
27. See Martin J. Siegel, For Better or Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitu-
tion, 30 J. FAm. L. 45, 46 & n.8 (1991-92) ("By bequeathing property only to the sons
of their wives, men could be certain they were passing on their inheritance to their
legitimate heirs. An economic system built on the concept of private property re-
quired sexual faithfulness within marriage for its survival.").
28. Id. at 47.
29. Id. at 48.
30. Our society today, although still repressive, allows for a greater display of
sexuality.
31. Siegel, supra note 27, at 50 n.36 (listing 25 states that have retained their
adultery laws).
32. The Minnesota adultery law is included in Chapter 609 of the Criminal Code,
Crimes against the Family. MiNN. STAT. § 609.36 (1992).
33. For example, the Minnesota Adultery law provides:
Subdivision 1. Acts constituting. When a married woman has sexual
intercourse with a man other than her husband, whether married or not,
both are guilty of adultery and may be sentenced to imprisonment for
not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000,
or both.
Subd. 2. Limitations. No prosecution shall be commenced under this
section except on complaint of the husband or the wife ....
Subd. 3. Defense. It is a defense to violation of this section if the mari-
tal status of the woman was not known to the defendant at the time of
the act of adultery.
MiNN. STAT. § 609.36 (emphasis added).
This blatantly sexist law provides for prosecution of a married woman and her
partner while a married man and his unmarried partner can only be convicted of the
lesser offense of fornication. Compare MiNN. STAT. § 609.34 (1992) ("When any man
432 [Vol. 12:429
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rarely used,3 4 they remain available and are used by angry
spouses.3 5
In addition to adultery laws, society restricts female sexuality
in other ways.36 Statutory rape laws demonstrate another societal
attempt to keep girls pure.3 7 Statutory rape laws first surfaced in
the Elizabethan age, when women were considered the property of
their husbands or fathers.5 8 Society valued a virginal bride as a
more prized commodity than a woman who had previously engaged
in sexual activity.3 9 Thus, Elizabethan society ensured a woman's
value by prohibiting female premarital sexual activity.40
One need not go back to the Elizabethan age, however, to find
evidence that statutory rape laws were intended to protect girls be-
cause they were the valued property of men. Freud alluded to this
male right when he wrote that "[tihe demand that the girl shall
bring with her into marriage with one man no memory of sexual
relations with another is after all nothing but a logical consequence
of the exclusive right of possession over a woman.... " 4 1 Statutory
rape laws have long served to protect this "right of possession."
and single woman have sexual intercourse with each other, each is guilty of fornica-
tion, which is a misdemeanor.").
34. Siegel, supra note 27, at 56.
35. In a recent Wisconsin case, a man used the state's adultery law against his
wife in a bitter divorce case. See, Elizabeth Mehren, What We Really Think About
Adultery, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1991, part E, p.1, column 2; William E. Schmidt, Adul-
tery as a Crime: Old Laws Dusted Off in a Wisconsin Case, N.Y. TIMES, April 30,
1990, Section A, P.1, Col. 1; Charles Bremner, U.S. Court Deal Averts Trial of Adul-
teress, THE TIMES (LONDON), May 9, 1990, overseas news section.
36. Abortion laws represent another way society limits reproductive options for
women and thus controls female sexuality. One commentator has cast the abortion
debate in terms of equal protection rather than due process. See GUIDO CALABRESI,
IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 101 (1985). Calabresi states that, "the
essence of the argument in favor of abortion is an equality argument." Id. He fur-
ther states, "without a right to abortion women are not equal to men in the law...
with respect, that is, to sexual freedom." Id.
37. Maryanne Lyons, Comment, Adolescents in Jeopardy: An Analysis of Texas'
Promiscuity Defense for Sexual Assault 29 Hou. L. REv. 583, 586-87 (1992). "ITihe
original purpose of making statutory rape a special offense was 'to protect virtuous
maidens' or to protect the marriageability of minor females. Some American case
law indicates that 'the purity of womanhood' was the main legislative impetus be-
hind the enactment of some of the first statutory rape statutes." Id.
38. Marilyn J. Ireland, Reform Rape Legislation: A New Standard of Sexual Re-
sponsibility, 49 U. CoLO. L. REV. 185, 187 (1977-78).
39. Id. "Historically, the right to the sexual possession of the woman was a valu-
able commodity given to the husband by the father. Therefore, female chastity was
much more revered than male chastity." Id.
40. Id.
41. See generally SIGMUND FREUD, CorRIBuTONS TO THE PsycHoLouy OF LOVE
THE TABOO OF VIRGINITY first published in SAMMLUNG KLEINER SCHRIFTEN ZUR
NEUROSENLEHRE, (Vierte Folge, Vienna, 1918), reprinted in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS 217
(Ernest Jones, M.D. ed., Joan Riviere trans., 1925).
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Recently, the United States Supreme Court upheld a statutory
rape law in which a male could be prosecuted for having sex with an
underage female, but a female could not be prosecuted for having
sex with an underage male.4 2 This law in effect declared male teen-
age sexual activity acceptable while simultaneously proscribing
similar female sexual activity. The California Supreme Court re-
garded the statute as a legitimate means of preventing teenage
pregnancy. 43 A plurality of the United States Supreme Court
agreed with the California court's characterization and upheld the
law. 4
4
Society has used adultery, fornication, and statutory rape laws
throughout history to "protect" women from sex. But these laws ac-
tually serve to protect men's property interest in women. The his-
toric interest in maintaining women's chastity has led to more
severe restrictions on female sexual activities than on male sexual
activities.
C. The Role of the Juvenile Courts
The juvenile court has played a major role in maintaining the
historical paternalism toward girls. Since its inception, the juvenile
system has been designed to protect and to rehabilitate young of-
fenders. 45 Progressives began the movement toward a separate ju-
42. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). The law defined as un-
lawful sexual intercourse "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female
not the wife of a perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." CAL.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 261.5 (West Supp. 1981).
43. The court stated that:
There can be no doubt that section 261.5 discriminates on the basis of
sex because only females can be victims, and only males can violate the
section. However, this obviously discriminatory classification scheme is
readily justified by an important state interest .... [T]he law herein
challenged is supported not by mere social convention but by the immu-
table physiological fact that it is the female exclusively who can become
pregnant. This changeless physical law, coupled with the tragic human
costs of illegitimate teenage pregnancies, generates a compelling and
demonstrable state interest in minimizing both the number of such
pregnancies and their disastrous consequences. Accordingly, the Legis-
lature is amply justified in retaining its historic statutory rape law be-
cause of the potentially devastating social and economic results which
may follow its violation.
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 601 P.2d 572, 575 (Cal. 1979).
44. 450 U.S. at 476. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, found that the
state had an important interest in preventing illegitimate pregnancies and that the
gender-based classification was sufficiently related to that end, "[blecause virtually
al the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage preg-
nancy fall on the young female." Id.
45. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198 (1905) (denying a juvenile due pro-
cess in a hearing in which he was sentenced to the local institution for delinquent
boys).
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venile court, advocating for a system that would save the wayward
child and set him or her on a path to a more wholesome life.46 The
court's role of rehabilitation was possible under the doctrine of
parens patriae, the state as parent. 47 This doctrine legitimated the
use of informal, discretionary procedures in the juvenile courts.48
In its paternal role, the presiding juvenile court judge determines
the "best interests of the child" in an informal setting.49 The court's
inquiry centers around the child's lifestyle and character, rather
than the offense committed.50 Also consistent with this paternal
model is the discretion afforded the juvenile court judge.51 In this
rehabilitation model, the judge is given a great deal of freedom in
sentencing. Such expansive discretion is given because the judge's
task is to save the child, rather than punish the behavior. Until
recently, the rehabilitative role of the juvenile court went largely
unchallenged. In recent years, however, the system has come
under attack for its punitive outcomes. 5 2
Critics maintain that the juvenile court, despite its stated re-
habilitative goals, punishes children in much the same way as the
adult system.5 3 Most states have recognized the changing goals of
juvenile courts and have changed their purpose statements to re-
46. See Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punish-
ment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B. U. L. REv. 821, 824-25 (1988)
[hereinafter The Principle of Offense] ("The juvenile court movement attempted to
remove children from the adult criminal justice and corrections systems and provide
them with individualized treatment in a separate system."). For a thorough discus-
sion of the Progressive movement see Sanford Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An His-
torical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187 (1970).
47. The Fisher court was acting in the capacity of parens patriae. 62 A. at 202.
To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from continuing in a career
of crime, to end in maturer years in public punishment and disgrace,
the legislature surely may provide for the salvation of such a child, if its
parents or guardian be unable or unwilling to do so, by bringing it into
one of the courts of the state without any process at all, for the purpose
of subjecting it to the state's guardianship and protection.
Id.
48. See The Principle of Offense, supra note 46, at 824-25.
49. See id. Juvenile court personnel use informal, discretionary procedures to
"diagnose" the causes of delinquency and prescribe a cure. Id.
50. Id. at 825.
51. Id.
52. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals argued that:
Although there are examples of quality probation and other treatment
services, the truth is that these are few and far between. The majority
of our youths are falling through rehabilitative cracks. Juveniles are
often either exposed to experimental therapeutic techniques that are
demeaning or violate fairness, or they are banished to institutions that
fail to offer any treatment or accord with even minimal constitutional
requisites. The system is clearly far more punitive than rehabilitative.
Lanes v. Texas, 767 S.W.2d 789, 798-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (emphasis added).
53. See Barry C. Feld, The Punitive Juvenile Court and the Quality of Procedural
Justice: Disjunctions Between Rhetoric and Reality, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 443 (1990);
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flect an increasingly punitive approach to prosecuting juveniles.5 4
Currently, only two states still adhere to the traditional "child's
best interests" rationale to guide their juvenile courts.55 In 43
other states, juvenile courts consider both public welfare and the
welfare of the child.56 In some states, public safety concerns signifi-
cantly outweigh the child's interests. 57
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that juvenile
courts punish more often than they rehabilitate and consequently
granted juveniles some due process rights in delinquency proceed-
ings.5 8 In 1967 the Court granted juveniles rights of notice, assist-
ance of counsel, privilege against self incrimination, and the
opportunity to confront and cross examine witnesses. 59 In the fol-
lowing years, the Supreme Court supplemented these rights with
the right to have guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt,60 protec-
tion of the double jeopardy clause,6 1 and privilege against self-in-
crimination. 6 2 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,63 however, the Court
stopped short of granting juveniles the right to a jury trial. These
cases expressly limit due process rights to delinquency
proceedings.6 4
Janet Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The
Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N. CA. L. REv. 1083 (1991).
This led the Supreme Court to comment that juveniles receive the "worst of both
worlds." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). They receive "neither the
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children." Id. But see, Alfred Regnery, Getting Away With Murder:
Why the Juvenile Justice System Needs An Overhaul, 34 POL'Y & REv. 65 (1985)
(arguing that the juvenile system coddles young criminals).
54. See Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., The Right to a Public Jury Trial: A Need for To-
day's Juvenile Court, 76 JUDICATURE 230, 234 (1993).
55. Id. Only Kentucky and Massachusetts still regard the sole purpose ofjuve-
nile courts as serving the child's best interests. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. In Minnesota, for example, the purpose of the juvenile courts is "to pro-
mote the public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency by maintaining the integrity
of the substantive law prohibiting certain behavior and by developing individual re-
sponsibility for lawful behavior." MINN. STAT. § 260.011(2)(c) (1992).
58. Juveniles were first guaranteed certain due process rights in the landmark
case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
59. Id.
60. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
61. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy clause prohibits adult
criminal prosecution of youth after conviction in juvenile court for same offense).
62. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) The Court "assume[d] without decid-
ing that the Miranda principles were fully applicable to the present [juvenile] pro-
ceedings." Id. at 717 n.4.
63. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
64. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
436 [Vol. 12:429
1994] GENDER BIAS TOWARD STATUS OFFENDERS 437
II. Status Offenses
Status offenses are acts committed by juveniles that would not
be a crime if committed by an adult.65 The most common status
offenses are running away from home and truancy.66 Status offend-
ers differ from juvenile delinquents in that the latter have violated
federal, state, or local law.67 Juvenile courts have jurisdiction over
both juvenile delinquents and status offenders.68
A. Status Offenders as Dependent or Neglected Children
Juvenile courts also have jurisdiction over dependent or ne-
glected children. Many courts now label status offenders as Chil-
dren in Need of Protection (CHIPs),69 or as Children in Need of
Supervision (CHINS).70 Traditionally, these categories were re-
served for dependent or neglected children only.71 By including
65. FELD, supra note 9.
66. Id.
67. MiNN. STAT. § 260.015 subd. 5 (1992) (defining a "delinquent child" as an in-
dividual under 18 years of age who violates any state, local, or federal criminal law).
68. Minnesota statute provides that the "juvenile court has original and exclu-
sive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child who is alleged to be delinquent,
a juvenile traffic offender, a juvenile petty offender, in need of protection or services,
or neglected and in foster care .... " MinN. STAT. § 260.111 subd. 1 (1992).
69. The Minnesota statute provides that:
Subd. 2a. "Child in need of protection or services" means a child who is
in need of protection or services because the child: ....
(9) is one whose behavior, condition, or environment is such as to
be injurious or dangerous to the child or others. An injurious or
dangerous environment may include, but is not limited to, the ex-
posure of a child to criminal activity in the child's home;
(10) has committed a delinquent act before becoming ten years old;
(11) is a runaway;
(12) is an habitual truant.
MINN. STAT. § 260.015 (1992).
70. Alabama defines a child in need of supervision as a child who:
a. Being subject to compulsory school attendance, is habitually truant
from school; or
b. Disobeys the reasonable and lawful demands of the child's parents,
guardian, or other custodian and is beyond their control; or
c. Has committed an offense established by law but not classified as
criminal or one applicable only to children; and
d. In any of the foregoing, is in need of care or rehabilitation.
ALA. CODE. § 12-15-1 (1993).
71. For example, in 1988, the Minnesota legislature voted to categorize run-
aways and truants as children in need of protection or services (CHIPs). 1988 Minn.
Laws 673. The statute defines a CHIP as a child who:
(1) is abandoned or without parent, guardian, or custodian;
(2) (i) has been a victim of physical or sexual abuse, or
(ii) resides with or has resided with a victim of domestic child
abuse...
(iii) resides with or would reside with a perpetrator of domestic
child abuse...
(iv) is a victim of emotional maltreatment...
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runaways and truants in these categories, it is difficult to deter-
mine the number of juveniles charged with status offenses.7 2 Fur-
thermore, combining these groups with statistics on dependent and
neglected children has made it difficult to measure the differential
treatment of female and male status offenders within the system.
It becomes nearly impossible to monitor the progress of status of-
fenders through the juvenile system and to determine the disposi-
tion they ultimately receive. This blurring of lines increases the
likelihood that unequal or unduly harsh treatment will go unde-
tected by outside observers.
B. Denial of Due Process Rights for Status Offenders
Status offenders have none of the due process protections af-
forded juvenile delinquents. 73 While states may provide due pro-
cess rights to status offenders, most have failed to do so. 7 4 Because
the judiciary views their role toward status offenders as rehabilita-
tive, 75 rather than punitive, courts provide little procedural protec-
tions to status offenders. 76
In re Spalding7 7 illustrates the lack of protections afforded
status offenders. Spalding was charged with both delinquency and
being a child in need of supervision because she allegedly engaged
in "acts of sexual intercourse and sexual perversion with an un-
(3) is without necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other re-
quired care for the child's physical or mental health or morals...
(4) is without the special care made necessary by a physical, mental, or
emotional condition...
(5) is medically neglected...
(6) is one whose parent, guardian, or other custodian for good cause
desires to be relieved of the child's care and custody;
(7) has been placed for adoption or care in violation of law;
(8) is without proper parental care because of the emotional, mental, or
physical disability, or state ofimmaturity of the child's parent, guard-
ian, or other custodian;
MINN. STAT. § 260.015 subd. 2a (1992). Status offenders then may face any of the
dispositions available for CHIPs. MINN. STAT. § 260.191 subd. 1 (a)(1)-(4) (1992).
The statute also provides additional dispositions, available for the child who "was
adjudicated in need of protection or services because the child is a runaway or habit-
ual truant." MINN. STAT. § 260.191 subd. 1 (b)(1)-(8) (1992).
72. Since many states include status offenders with statistics on dependent/ne-
glected children, it is impossible to know exactly how many children are charged
with status offenses.
73. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. For a discussion of due pro-
cess rights of status offenders see Erin M. Smith, In a Child's Best Interest: Juvenile
Status Offenders Deserve Procedural Due Process, 10 LAw & INEQ. J. 253 (1992).
74. Id. at 259.
75. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
76. See Smith, supra note 73, at 257.
77. 332 A.2d 246 (Md. 1975).
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known number of males and females for a period of more than one
year."7 8 Spalding attempted to assert her privilege against self-in-
crimination. 79 The Maryland Court of Appeals, purporting to fol-
low Gault,8 0 denied Spalding this right.81 The court decided that
Spalding was actually a victim, and held that the delinquency peti-
tion was an "anomaly."8 2 The court stated that "since [Spalding]
was not charged with an act which, in the circumstances of this
case, would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, the privi-
lege against self-incrimination is not applicable to these proceed-
ings."83 Even though the court considered Spalding a victim, it still
removed her from her home.8 4 The court denied her right against
78. Id. at 248 n.2. The petition further contended that Spalding was "ungovern-
able and beyond the control of her parent, deports herself in such a manner as to be a
danger to herself and others and is in need of care and treatment." Id.
The court quoted with approval the Maryland Court of Special Appeals' explana-
tion of the difference between an adjudication of delinquency and a finding that a
child is a 'child in need of supervision:'
[An important purpose of the legislative revision of the juvenile code
was to insulate certain forms of juvenile misconduct from the conse-
quences of an adjudication of delinquency as described in Gault. The
creation of the category of CINS reflects a studied design of the legisla-
ture to insure that treatment of children guilty of misconduct peculiarly
reflecting the propensities and susceptibilities of youth, will acquire
none of the institutional, quasi-penal features of treatment that in
Gault's view had been the main difference between the theory and the
practice of the juvenile court system.
Id. at 252.
79. Id. at 260.
80. In re Spalding, 332 A.2d 246 (Md. 1975). The Supreme Court, in Gault, de-
veloped a two-part test to determine whether a constitutional right applied to
juveniles. First, the proceeding must be to adjudicate delinquency. Second, the de-
linquency must be such that it could result in commitment to a state institution.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 49.
81. Spalding, 332 A.2d at 246. Using the Gault test, the Spalding court con-
cluded that children in need of supervision (CINS) are not eligible for the right
against self-incrimination even though the Gault court actually said that "[i]t would
indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to
hardened criminals but not to children. The language of the Fifth Amendment, ap-
plicable to the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is unequivocal and
with exception. And the scope of privilege is comprehensive." Gault, 387 U.S. at 52.
82. Spalding, 332 A.2d at 256.
[I]n the context of all the material events, which ensued during the crit-
ical period, since she was, in fact, a victim, the charge of 'delinquency'
in the petition must be regarded as simply an unexplained anomaly
.... That this was the position of the police is borne out not merely by
their subsequent testimony, but also by their immediate application for
adult arrest warrants listing the girls as victims; the overnight deten-
tion for the purpose of 'protective custody'; and the total absence of sug-
gested criminality on the part of the girls in any police records.
Id.
83. Id. at 257.
84. Id. at 251 (committing Spalding to the jurisdiction of the Department of Ju-
venile Services for placement in a foster home).
Law and Inequality
self-incrimination, then deprived her of her liberty by ordering her
to live in a foster home.
In re Spalding demonstrates the injustice in status offender
cases. Status offenders do not have the due process rights afforded
to delinquent juveniles and adults. Courts deny these rights, yet at
the same time they deny status offenders their liberty. In one
sense, status offenders are treated like adults in that they can be
deprived of their liberty as a form of punishment.85 At the same
time, they are treated like children in that they are denied due pro-
cess rights.86 In this way status offenders receive the worst of both
worlds.8 7
C. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
Before 1974, juvenile detention facilities routinely housed
both juvenile delinquents and status offenders.88 In some states,
juveniles were incarcerated in adult facilities with adult criminal
defendants.89 In response to this and other national juvenile jus-
tice problems, Congress passed the JJDPA in 1974.9o The JJDPA
directed participating states to incarcerate juvenile delinquents
and adults in separate facilities and to completely deinstitutional-
ize status offenders.91
"Valid Court Order" Amendment
The JJDPA's mandate to deinstitutionalize status offenders
frustrated juvenile court judges' ability to deal with status offend-
ers. Judges found themselves in the position of repeatedly ordering
85. Status offenders face placement in "secure detention facilities" if they violate
a "valid court order." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5603 (12) & (13) and 5633 (a)(12)(A); see also
infra notes 92-97; see supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 53.
88. See Kristina H. Chung, Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of Incarcerating
Juveniles in Adult Jails, 66 IND. L.J. 999, 999 (1991).
89. See id.
90. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
415, 88 Stat. 1109 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5601-778 (1988 & Supp. 1989)). During
congressional debate the articulated purposes of the JJDPA were stated as "de-
velop[ing] effective methods of preventing and reducing juvenile delinquency, divert-
ing juveniles from the juvenile justice system, and providing critically needed
alternatives to incarceration." 120 CONG. REC. 25,162 (1974).
91. The JJDPA originally provided that in order for a state to receive formula
grants the state needed to submit a plan designed to ensure that "within two years
... juveniles who are charged with or who have committed offenses that would not be
criminal if committed by an adult.., shall not be placed in juvenile detention or
correctional facilities." Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (a)(12)(A) (1988 &
Supp. 1989)).
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runaways to remain in unlocked facilities, only to have them run
away again.9 2 In response, Congress passed an amendment to the
JJDPA in 1980 allowing juvenile courts to incarcerate status of-
fenders for violating a valid court order. 93 The amendment provides
that a juvenile can be detained in a secure detention facility if the
juvenile commits any offense that would be a crime if committed by
an adult, or if the juvenile has violated a "valid court order."9 4
In most states, a judge can issue an order requiring a status
offender to stay at home, live in foster care, attend counseling, or
any of several other dispositions provided by statute.95 When a ju-
venile violates that court order, the 1980 amendment to the JJDPA
allows the juvenile court to place the child in a secure detention or
92. During the House debate of the "valid court order" amendment, Representa-
tive Ashbrook read part of a judicial opinion in which the judge reported one girl's
history in the juvenile courts. The girl had repeatedly run away from halfway
houses and treatment facilities. Because she was always placed in unlocked facili-
ties, the juvenile courts were unable to keep her in any single placement. 126 CONG.
REc. 30,227 (1980).
93. The 1980 amendment provided, in part:
[Jiuveniles who are charged with or who have committed offenses that
would not be criminal if committed by an adult or offenses which do not
constitute violations of valid court orders ... shall not be placed in se-
cure detention facilities or secure correctional facilities ....
42 U.S.C. § 5633 (aX12)(A) (1988) (emphasis added) (codifying Act of Dec. 8, 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-509, § ll(a)(3), 94 Stat. 2757).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 39G (West 1992); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 169-D:17 (1990). In Minnesota, the court can order a runaway juvenile to
remain at home, attend school, or to obey his or her parent(s). Minnesota state law
allows a court to order any of the following dispositions:
(1) counsel the child or the child's parents, guardian, or custodian;
(2) place the child under the supervision of a probation officer or other
suitable person in the child's own home under conditions prescribed by
the court, including reasonable rules for the child's conduct . . .
designed for the physical, mental, and moral well-being and behavior of
the child....
(3) subject to the court's supervision, transfer legal custody of the child
to one of the following:
(i) a reputable person of good moral character....
(ii) a county probation officer for placement in a group foster
home....
(4) require the child to pay a fine of up to $100....
(5) require the child to participate in a community service project;
(6) order the child to undergo a chemical dependency evaluation and, if
warranted by the evaluation, order participation by the child in a drug
awareness program or an inpatient or outpatient chemical dependency
treatment program;
(7) ... the court may recommend to the commissioner of public safety
that the child's driver's license be canceled [sic] for any period up to the
child's 18th birthday;
(8) require the child to perform any other activities or participate in
any other treatment programs deemed appropriate by the court.
MiN. STAT. § 260.191 subd. 1(bl1)-(8) (1992).
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correctional facility.96 In other words, a status offender may be
incarcerated in a secure facility, despite never having committed a
crime. 9 7
The indeterminate nature of juvenile sentencing allows a juve-
nile who violates a valid court order to be incarcerated for years at a
time.98 In Minnesota, juvenile courts generally retain dispositional
jurisdiction over juveniles until they are nineteen years old.9 9
Thus, a thirteen year old who violates a court order requiring her to
attend school could theoretically be incarcerated for as long as six
years. 100
Juveniles violate court orders and fall within the JJDPA
amendment for many different reasons. Many juveniles run away
because of abuse or neglect at home.1O1 Others are "throwaways,"
96. The federal statute defines "secure detention facility" as any public or private
residential facility which
(A) includes construction fixtures designed to physically restrict the
movements and activities of juveniles or other individuals held in law-
ful custody in such facility; and
(B) is used for the temporary placement of any juvenile who is accused
of having committed an offense, of any non-offender, or of any other
individual accused of having committed a criminal offense.
42 U.S.C. § 5603(12)(A) & (B).
The statute defines a "secure correctional facility" as any public or private resi-
dential facility which
(A) includes construction fixtures designed to physically restrict the
movements and activities of juveniles or other individuals held in law-
ful custody in such facility; and
(B) is used for the placement, after adjudication and disposition, of any
juvenile who has been adjudicated as having committed an offense, any
non-offender, or any other individual convicted of a criminal offense.
42 U.S.C. § 5603(13)(A) & (B).
97. It is this aspect of the amendment which is most troubling. It makes no
sense to place a non-delinquent status offender in a facility with delinquent
juveniles. If children are truly impressionable and susceptible to dangerous influ-
ences then is locking them up with delinquent juveniles really "in their best inter-
est?" See infra Part III. D.
98. Theoretically, the role of the juvenile court is to protect children, rather than
punish them. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text. Thus, the courts may
impose a disposition for an indeterminate amount of time, as long as it is in the best
interests of the child.
99. MINN. STAT. § 260.181 subd. 4 (1992). The age at which the juvenile court
loses jurisdiction over an individual varies from state to state.
100. The facility may be far away from the child's neighborhood, school, friends,
work and community resources. Minnesota law is silent on the subject of where a
child may be incarcerated. Location of the facility may have a significant impact on
juveniles living in rural areas. If there is no juvenile facility in the child's commu-
nity, the youth could be sent to a facility in another part of the state.
101. See Aric Press, When Children Go to Jail, NEWSWEEK, May 27, 1985, at 87.
"Some youths are guilty of nothing more than being abused by their parents: they
are locked up for their own protection." Id. Paul Mones, legal director of the Public
Justice Foundation in Santa Monica, CA, called incarceration of juveniles "the most
insidious form of child abuse, because it is state-sanctioned." Id.
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forced out of their homes by their parents. lo 2 Under the JJDPA
courts may detain these juveniles in secure facilities. Although in
some circumstances it may be appropriate to formally place these
juveniles out of the home, removing them as "status offenders" bur-
dens them with undeserved stigma and dangerous exposure to
criminal influence. The counterproductive nature of the "valid
court order" amendment and the perversion of the "best interest of
the child" standard is made manifest in the legislative history of the
amendment.
Legislative History
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
(Council of Judges)1O3 supported passage of the "valid court order"
amendment.10 4 The Council was instrumental in getting the bill
through the House of Representatives, in which there was consider-
able opposition.l 0 5 Judge John Milligan, speaking to the House Ed-
ucation and Labor Committee on behalf of the Council of Judges,
emphasized the need to protect girls from society and from sex.' 0 6
He proposed giving judges more discretion to deal with these
girls.107 Judge Milligan's comments reflect the paternalistic view
that guides many juvenile court judges.lO8
102. See Chung, supra note 88, at 1005. Throwaways are forced out of their
homes by their parents because of family conflict or for economic reasons. Id.
103. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges was formed in
1937 by a group of juvenile court judges. IRA M. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR
JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 91-92 (1989). The Coun-
cil is "dedicated to improving the juvenile justice system" in the United States. Id.
at 92 (quoting National Conference of State Legislatures (1988)).
104. U.S. Rep. Ashbrook, author of the amendment, commended the Council of
Judges for "work[ing] long and hard to convince legislators that their ability to deal
with juvenile offenders was severely hampered by restrictions on the implementa-
tion of their valid court orders." 126 CONG. REC. 30,296 (1980).
105. The amendment failed in committee. Id. Rep. Ashbrook then introduced the
amendment to the full house, where it passed with a 239 to 123 vote. 126 CONG.
REC. 30,232 (1980).
106. "Horror stories of chronic runaways who have been abused, raped, prosti-
tuted, and sometimes murdered should underscore the imperative of some ultimate,
bottom-line authority over such youth." Id. at 30,296-97.
107. Id.
108. In 1975, Hunter Hurst, director of the Juvenile Justice Division of the Coun-
cil of Judges, gave his impressions of the juvenile justice system in a speech to the
New Mexico Council on Crime and Delinquency. Hunter Hurst, Juvenile Status Of-
fenders, Address Before the New Mexico Council on Crime and Delinquency (June
20, 1975) cited in Meda Chesney-Lind, Judicial Paternalism and the Female Status
Offender: Training Women to Know Their Place, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 121, 127
(1977). He gave his impressions of the JJDPA's treatment of status offenders and
the lack of discretion it gave to judges to deal with them. According to Hurst, society
does not like to think of girls as sexually promiscuous. "It's not the way we like to
think about females in this country." Id. He advocated giving judges more discre-
tion for dealing with girls, arguing that "[als long as it offends our values, be sure
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Judge Milligan anticipated questions about the possibility
that judges would abuse the discretion afforded them in the 1980
amendment. According to Judge Milligan, the phrase "valid court
order" protects juveniles.l0 9 Judge Milligan claimed that "[a] 'valid
court order' means one that is issued after full due process rights
have been accorded to the youth .... -11o He then listed the due
process rights available to juveniles in delinquency proceedings
through In re Gault."' Judge Milligan's proposal, however, fails to
recognize that procedural safeguards are not in place for status of-
fense proceedings.112
Debate in the House of Representatives further demonstrates
the paternalistic attitudes contributing to the passage of the JJDPA
amendment.113 Representative Ashbrook, in a written speech en-
tered into the Congressional Record, listed the organizations op-
posed to the amendment,1"4 and suggested that
[mlaybe our learned judges should take a moment of their time
to talk to some of these groups like a Dutch uncle and instill
some sense of what is really involved in these issues. Girl
Scouts of the U.S.A.? Now really. Maybe when the Scouts grow
up they will see things differently. 115
He concluded his speech saying "[s]ociety won today. Parents won
today. Our fine judges won today.""l 6
Representative Ashbrook clearly expressed his feeling that
judges are best able to meet the needs of runaway girls.117 His
comments suggest that giving judges more discretion will always be
that police, or the church or vigilante groups, or somebody is going to do something
about it. For me, I would rather that something occur in the court where the rights
of the parties can be protected." Id.
Hurst's language reflects the feeling of some judges on the Council, that society
ought to prevent females from being sexually active. It suggests that the predomi-
nant role of the juvenile court is to "protect" females by controlling their sexuality,
rather than meeting the girls' individual needs. This view conflicts with the stated
goal of the juvenile court system, which is the individualized treatment of juveniles
according to the best interests of the child. The clear implication of Judge Hurst's
comments is that sexist attitudes in society justify sexist treatment of juveniles in
court.
109. 126 CONG. REC. 30,297 (1980).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
113. 126 CONG. REc. 30,227-232 (1980).
114. Forty-two organizations serving youth opposed the amendment. These orga-
nizations included such well respected national organizations as the YMCA, Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, National
League of Cities, National Council of Jewish Women, National Youth Work Alliance,
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in the best interest of the child. He favored giving judges complete
discretion in dealing with status offenders, including discretion to
order institutionalization.
Institutionalization, however, increases judicial discretion.
Increased discretion gives judges greater power to impose personal
values on juveniles. A judge's personal values are not always best
for the child.
In addition to the paternalistic goals, Congress demonstrated
punitive goals in passing the "valid court order" amendment. Dur-
ing debate in the House, legislators repeatedly referred to run-
aways' ability to "flout the will of the court" if judges did not have
the authority to place them in secure facilities.118 These comments
indicate the legislature's desire to punish rebellious or non-con-
forming juveniles.
The "valid court order" amendment was also adopted to enable
parents to exert more control over their children. The Council of
Judges emphasized the need of Congress to "underwrite families
and schools in meeting their custody, care, and education responsi-
bilities."119 The amendment gives parents greater leverage in try-
ing to control their daughters' sexuality. Running away from home
may euphemistically be used to describe a child who repeatedly
stays out all night, or spends the night at her boyfriend's house.12o
Many parents continue to be more concerned about this type of be-
havior in a female teenager than in a male teenager.121 This dispa-
rate treatment of juveniles has a negative impact on females,
evidenced by the difference in numbers of reported female status
offenders as compared to male status offenders. Of the juveniles
who have petitions122 filed against them in juvenile court, females
118. 126 CONG. REC. 30,228-232 (1980) (statements by Rep. John Ashbrook and
Rep. E. Thomas Coleman).
119. Id. at 30,297.
120. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Gender Bias in Juvenile Justice
Processing: Implications of the JJDP Act, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1162, 1163
(1992). A parent can easily report a child as a runaway, even though the parent's
real concern is with the child's sexuality. Teenage sexual behavior often involves
staying out late, or all night, which enables a parent to report a child as a runaway.
121. Meda Chesney-Lind, Guilty by Reason of Sex: Young Women and the Juve-
nile Justice System, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND WOMEN 77, 90-91 (Bar-
bara Raffel Price & Natalie J. Sokoloff eds., 1982). Meda Chesney-Lind suggested
that "[flamilies have always had different expectations and made different demands
of male and female children. From their sons, parents expect achievement, aggres-
siveness, independence, but from their daughters obedience, passivity, and implic-
itly, chastity." Id. at 90-91 & n.72.
122. A petition is the formal initiation of the juvenile process. It fills the same
function that a complaint fills in the adult criminal system. FELD, supra note 9.
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are more likely than males to have a petition filed because of a sta-
tus offense. 12 3
III. Judicial Discretion and Paternalism in the Juvenile
Court System
A. Gender Discrimination Against Female Status
Offenders
The history of paternalism in the juvenile court system has
resulted in the discriminatory treatment of female juveniles. 12 4 The
Minnesota Supreme Court Gender Fairness Task Force125 (Task
Force) found that female runaways in Minnesota receive more se-
vere sentences than male runaways. 126 The Task Force also found
evidence that judges retain sexist, paternalistic attitudes toward fe-
male juveniles. 12 7 Other commentators document similar trends
nationwide. 128 For example, a recent study of the Florida juvenile
justice system reports that girls found in contempt of court are
much more likely than boys to be sentenced to incarceration in se-
cure detention facilities.129
123. This is true both in Minnesota and nationwide. In Minnesota, in 1992, 37%
of the petitions filed against females were for status offenses, while only 22% of the
petitions filed against boys were for status offenses. Telephone Interview with
Sharon Caretich, Supreme Court Office of Research and Planning (Oct. 6, 1993).
124. Unequal treatment of status offenders based on gender is well documented.
See, e.g., Bishop & Frazier, supra note 120; Barry C. Feld, Right to Counsel in Juve-
nile Court, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1274-80 (1989) [hereinafter Right to
Counsel]; Marvin D. Krohn et al., Is Chivalry Dead? An Analysis of Changes in Police
Dispositions of Males and Females, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 417 (1983); Susan K. Datesman
& Frank R. Scarpitti, Unequal Protection for Males and Females in the Juvenile
Court, in WOMEN, CRIME, AND JUSTICE (Susan K. Datesman & Frank R. Scarpitti
eds., 1980). But see Stevens H. Clarke & Gary G. Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or
Crime Control, and Do Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 263 (1980);
Katherine S. Teilman & Pierre H. Landry Jr., Gender Bias in Juvenile Justice, 18 J.
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 47 (1981).
125. The Gender Fairness Task Force was created in 1987 to "explore the extent
to which gender bias exists in the Minnesota state court system, to identify and doc-
ument gender bias where found, and to recommend methods for its elimination."
Preface to Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force for Gender Fairness in the Courts,
Final Report, reprinted in 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 825, 835 (1989) [hereinafter
Final Report].
126. Final Report, supra note 125, at 911.
127. One attorney interviewed by the Task Force reported that she often heard a
judge comment on a female juvenile's physical attractiveness. Id. at 909. In another
case, a judge reportedly ordered a girl to reappear without jewelry and makeup and
remarked that "you look like a whore with all that makeup on anyway." Id. Another
attorney commented that "[t]he juvenile court is the real bastion of sexism and pa-
ternalism in the criminal justice system." Id. at 908.
128. See, e.g., Bishop & Frazier, supra note 120; Krohn et al., supra note 124, at
418.
129. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 120, at 1185. The study discussed in the article
analyzed records of status and non-status offense referrals processed in Florida over
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Parents also contribute to unequal treatment of girls by sub-
jecting their daughters to the court system. Parents often refer
runaways to juvenile court.130 While police or probation officers are
generally responsible for youths entering the juvenile system for
delinquency offenses, parents more often refer runaways. 13 1 Some
scholars suggest that parents report their daughters to juvenile
courts as runaways when they become sexually active.13 2 Fearing
that they will lose control of their daughter's sexuality, parents
turn to the court for assistance in controlling their daughter's sex-
ual behavior.13 3 Consequently, many girls end up in the juvenile
justice system.134
When judges and parents use the JJDPA to control teenage
female sexuality, they perpetuate the paternalistic agenda begun
with adultery and statutory rape laws. 135 The "valid court order"
amendment criminalizes behavior that the legislature considers im-
moral, in the same manner that adultery, abortion, and statutory
rape laws punish immoral behavior. The amendment allows both
parents and judges to act upon their own sense of morality. The
judicial discretion granted by the "valid court order" permits a
judge at one moment to incarcerate a female for sexual activity, and
at the next moment to dismiss identical male sexual behavior.
B. 1980 Amendment Has Allowed Juvenile Court Judges
to Continue Their Paternalistic Agenda
The "valid court order" amendment less obviously controls fe-
male sexual behavior than past laws such as fornication and statu-
a three year period from 1985 to 1987. Id. at 1168. The study looked at the effects of
social characteristics (gender, race, and age), current offense (seriousness and con-
tempt status), and offense history on court referral, adjudication, and disposition.
Id. at 1169-74. The study also explored the effects of judicial decisions made at ear-
lier stages in the process on subsequent outcomes. This allowed for identification of
"indirect effects of gender on case outcomes." Id.
130. Id. at 1178-79.
131. Id. at 1163, n.5. This is significant because the parent is often the only link
the child has to an attorney. If the state does not provide representation for the
child, the parent is usually the only other source for legal services. Most children do
not have the financial resources to access legal assistance on their own. If the parent
brings the child to the juvenile justice system, it is unlikely that the parent would
then assist in the child's defense. This may account, in part, for the lower rates of
representation among status offenders. See Right to Counsel, supra note 124, at
1223.
132. See Chesney-Lind, supra note 121, at 90-91.
133. Id.
134. Most status offenders are girls and they face legal action for running away or
for truancy. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text; see also supra notes
119-23 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 38-44
and accompanying text.
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tory rape statutes. In practice, however, the "valid court order"
amendment works as a device to restrict female sexuality. Since
1980, judges have disproportionately sentenced girls to secure de-
tention facilities for disobeying court orders.13 6 One recent study
provides empirical data to support the conclusion that court orders
have been used to incarcerate relatively more female status offend-
ers than male status offenders. i3 7
The 1980 amendment permits unequal treatment through its
addition of discretion. Whenever discretion is available, the possi-
bility of unequal treatment increases. 138 When a judge has un-
checked discretion, he or she is free to make decisions based on
gender or the judge's own personal sense of morality, rather than
on the offense committed.
Courts and legislatures have increasingly limited judicial dis-
cretion in processing juvenile delinquents and adults. 13 9 Specific
due process rights for juvenilesl4O and, in some states, sentencing
guidelines for juveniles,14 1 illustrate a trend toward more formal
processing and less judicial discretion for juvenile offenders.142 In
contrast, status offenders, arguably the most vulnerable group in
the criminal justice system, 143 are afforded the least amount of for-
mal protection and are subjected to the most judicial discretion.
The dangers of this lack of protection amplify the need for juvenile
representation. Children usually do not have the resources avail-
136. See, e.g., Bishop & Frazier, supra note 120, at 1185.
137. Id. (concluding that "females found in contempt are much more likely than
their male counterparts to be sentenced to a period of up to six months' incarceration
in secure detention facilities").
138. See Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the
Juvenile Court, 69 MiNN. L. REV. 141, 255 (1984).
139. For example, in Minnesota "[olne of the primary purposes of the Minnesota
Sentencing Guidelines was to eliminate disparities based on factors such as race,
gender, socioeconomic status and community ties . .. ." Blake Nelson, The Minne-
sota Sentencing Guidelines: The Effects of Determinate Sentencing on Disparities in
Sentencing Decisions, 10 LAw & INEQ. J. 217 (1992).
140. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
141. As of 1991, almost one third of states used for serious offenders either mini-
mum mandatory sentencing, determinate sentencing statutes, or administrative
sentencing guidelines. These sentences are not based on the needs of the juvenile,
but rather on the crime they have committed. The Principle of Offense, supra note
46, at 889-90.
142. As juveniles are granted more procedural safeguards, juvenile proceedings
become more formal. The addition of the right to counsel, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and the other due process rights, necessarily removes the informal
atmosphere traditionally present in juveniles hearings. See Right to Counsel, supra
note 124, at 1187-88; see generally FELD, supra note 9.
143. Status offenders are more vulnerable because they tend to be younger than
juvenile delinquents. Because of their age they are less likely to have previously
encountered the juvenile justice system and are less able to defend themselves. See
Right to Counsel, supra note 124, at 1232-33.
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able to obtain counsel on their own. Normally the responsibility for
providing counsel falls on the juvenile's parents. Because status of-
fenders are referred to the court by their parents,144 the parents do
not often retain counsel for them.145 Because status ofenders lack
counsel at the initial hearing, there is unlikely to be an appeal.
Therefore, a juvenile judge's discretion is rarely questioned. Thus,
this vulnerable group, which is in particular need of statutory and
constitutional protections, continues to have fewer protections than
juvenile delinquents or adults.146
C. Punishment
Punishing status offenders is unjustified, harmful both physi-
cally and mentally, and undermines the goals of having a juvenile
justice system.14 7 By definition, a status offender has not commit-
ted a crime. At most, the juvenile has done something which our
society feels is inappropriate at their age, but which would be ac-
ceptable if the person were older. Sentencing jurisprudence holds
that a just system of punishment should only punish an offender for
an offense.' 48 Thus, in a just system, status offenders should not
face punishment. Furthermore, punishment is particularly unjusti-
144. See, e.g., supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 131-33
and accompanying text.
145. Status offenders have low rates of representation by counsel. While only
28.9% of status offenders in Minnesota have legal representation, 45%-77% of
juveniles charged with more serious offenses are represented by counsel. Right to
Counsel, supra note 124, at 1232-33.
146. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Once juveniles are committed to
detention facilities, the discriminatory treatment continues. CORAMAE R. MANN, FE-
MALE CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 150-51 (1984). Studies indicate that females are
more often subjected to physical examinations. Id. One study found that gynecologi-
cal examinations were ordered for 70% to 80% of girls suspected of sexual activity,
while only 12% to 18% of boys suspected of sexual activity were subject to physical
examinations. Id. at 150 (citing Meda Chesney-Lind, Judicial Enforcement of the
Female Sex Role: The Family Court and the Female Delinquent, 8 IssUEs IN CRIMI-
NOLOGY 51, 51-59 (1973)). Another study found that every girl in one facility was
subjected to gynecological examinations. Id. at 151 (citing TED RUBIN, JUVENILE Jus-
TICE 90 (1979)). In addition to the invasion of the girl's right of privacy, these exami-
nations show that the courts assume that female sexuality equals delinquency. Id.
(citing Meda Chesney-Lind, Judicial Paternalism and the Female Status Offender:
Training Women to Know Their Place, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 121-30 (1979)). These
examinations, in addition to being intrusive and uncomfortable, may be extremely
humiliating to a teenage girl. Id. The presence of the examinations also demon-
strates the juvenile system's interest in detecting female sexuality. Id. at 150 & n.56
(citing Elaine Selo, The Cottage Dwellers: Boys and Girls in Training Schools, in THE
FEMALE OFFENDER 154 (Laura Crites, ed. 1976)).
147. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
148. H.L.A. HART, PROLEGOMENON TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHMENT, reprinted
in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSILITY 11 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1968) (explaining the re-
tributivist moral imperitive of not punishing someone who has not committed a
crime).
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fled given that status offenders are afforded no due process rights.
It is a perversion of our justice system to punish juveniles who have
not committed a crime, without allowing them due process rights.
Many of the incarceration facilities provide a dangerous physi-
cal and psychological environment for status offenders.14 9 The
same facility often holds both delinquents and status offenders to-
gether.15o Thus, a thirteen year old runaway can stay with a sev-
enteen year old drug dealer. This raises questions about whether
the environment is healthy and safe, much less rehabilitative for
the thirteen year old. This situation may be psychologically and
socially damaging to the child because the child may learn criminal
behavior and develop anti-social attitudes in an attempt to conform.
This living situation is not the safe, nurturing atmosphere envi-
sioned by the Progressives. At its inception, the JJDPA was
designed to remove juveniles from adult jails and to deinstitutional-
ize status offenders.'15 It is consistent with those goals to place
status offenders and juvenile delinquents in separate facilities.
The American juvenile justice system has always considered
the role of the courts with respect to status offenders as one of reha-
bilitation.152 This traditional goal of the juvenile system is not
served through incarceration. Punishment in itself does not reha-
bilitate, because it does not address the underlying problems. Pun-
ishment incapacitates and serves retributive purposes, but is rarely
viewed as an appropriate form of rehabilitation.
The goal of rehabilitation is also problematic. Inherent in the
concept of rehabilitation is judicial discretion.153 This judicial dis-
cretion leads to the paternalistic treatment of status offenders.154
Female juveniles are brought into the juvenile system, and ulti-
mately incarcerated, because they are acting in ways that the tradi-
tional patriarchy finds unacceptable.155 Often, this unacceptable
behavior is sexual in nature.156
IV. Proposed Reforms of the Juvenile System
Congress certainly has an interest in keeping children safe,
and families intact, if an intact family is in the youth's best inter-
149. See Chung, supra note 88, at 1006 (noting that "countless incarcerated
juveniles fall victim to sexual assault, exploitation and other physical injury").
150. Id. at 1007.
151. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 10-22 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text. See also supra Part
III.A.
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ests. It is questionable, however, whether the 1980 amendment to
the JJDPA accomplishes these goals. Given the juvenile court's his-
tory of gender bias,157 the legislature should enact laws that limit
the possibility of continuing this bias.
Ideally, status offenders should be dealt with outside of the
juvenile justice system. The juvenile justice system has been inef-
fective in dealing with status offenders, using either the rehabilita-
tive or punitive approaches. A new approach would be to treat
status offenses as societal problems, not legal ones. 158 In the short
term, immediate reforms such as repeal of the "valid court order"
amendment, expansion of emancipation rights, and creation of due
process rights for status offenders would result in a better system of
juvenile justice. Aside from having a long range vision, immeditate
reform measure, like repeal, emancipation and securing due pro-
cess rights, can begin a better system of juvenile justice.
A. Repeal of the 1980 Amendment
The most obvious solution to the problems created by the
"valid court order" amendment is to repeal the amendment. Re-
pealing the amendment would help to equalize treatment of female
and male juveniles in the juvenile court system. Repeal of the
amendment would decrease opportunities for judges to sentence
juveniles based on their own values. Without the option of incarcer-
ation available, judges would be forced to give girls the same types
of dispositions that have always been given boys.15 9 While judges
might continue to treat girls and boys unequally, the disparity
would be less damaging to girls if they could not be given out-of-
home placements. A judge would no longer have the option of incar-
cerating a girl simply because he personally disapproved of her
behavior.
B. Emancipation
Another solution to the problems inherent in the "valid court
order" amendment is the creation of a statute providing for emanci-
pation of a minor child. Emancipation is the "process by which mi-
157. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
158. This framework would require that additional social service programs be
made available to families in order to cope with the underlying problems within the
family. More programs would also be needed for teenagers who leave their families
to live independently.
159. Boys are less oftenreferred to the juvenile system for status offenses. See
supra note 123 and accompanying text. Those boys who are referred are more fre-
quently ordered to live at home, even after repeated appearances in court. See Right
to Counsel, supra note 124, at 1276.
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nors attain legal adulthood before reaching the age of majority."160
Currently, several states regulate emancipation by statute,161
while others recognize emancipation at common law. Minnesota
falls in the latter category. 162 Early cases relied on the parent's
actions to determine whether a child was emancipated. 163 More re-
160. Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children
in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J. L. RPFonM 239, 240 (1992). Each state defines
emancipation either by statute or case law. In Minnesota, for example, emancipa-
tion means that the parent no longer has control over the child and the parent-child
relationship is dissolved. See Taubert v. Taubert, 114 N.W. 763, 764 (1908); Luftkin
v. Harvey, 154 N.W. 1097, 1098 (1915).
161. The California Legislature declared that:
It is the purpose of this part to provide a clear statement defining
emancipation and its consequences and to permit an emancipated mi-
nor to obtain a court declaration of the minor's status. This part is not
intended to affect the status of minors who may become emancipated
under the decisional case law that was in effect before the enactment of
Chapter 1059 of the Statutes of 1978.
CAL. FAm. CODE § 70011 (1993). The Michigan statute provides:
[A] minor emancipated by operation of law or by court order shall be
considered to have the rights and responsibilities of an adult, except for
those specific constitutional and statutory age requirements ... rele-
vant to him or her because of his or her age. A minor shall be consid-
ered emancipated for the purposes of, but not limited to, all of the
following:
(a) The right to enter into enforceable contracts, including apart-
ment leases.
(b) The right to sue or be sued in his or her own right.
(c) The right to retain his or her own earnings.
(d) The right to establish a separate domicile.
(e) The right to act autonomously, and with the rights and respon-
sibilities of an adult ....
(f) The right to earn a living ....
(g) The right to authorize his or her own preventive health care
*.. without parental knowledge or liability.
(h) The right to apply for a driver's license or other state licenses
(i) The right to register for school.
(j) The right to marry.
(k) The right to apply to the medical assistance program ....
(1) The right to apply for other welfare assistance, including gen-
eral assistance ....
(m) The right, if a parent, to make decisions and give authority in
caring for his or her own minor child.
(n) The right to make a will.
MICH. COMP. LAws § 722.4e (1992).
162. See Taubert, 114 N.W. at 764; Lufkin, 154 N.W. at 1098. Minnesota statutes
define emancipation for specific purposes. See, e.g., MIN. STAT. § 144.341 (1992)
(defining emancipation for purposes of giving consent for medical services); M-N.
STAT. § 256D.05 subd. 1(10) (defining an emancipated minor for purposes of receiv-
ing General Assistance grants, as a "person under the age of 18 years who: (i)has
been married; (ii) is on active duty in the uniformed services of the United States;
(iii) has been emancipated by a court of competent jurisdiction; or (iv) is otherwise
considered emancipated under Minnesota law").
163. See, e.g., Taubert, 114 N.W. at 764 (stating to constitute emancipation,
"[t]here must be a surrender by the parent of the right to the services of his minor
child, and also the right to the custody and control of his person").
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cently, Minnesota courts have relied on the circumstances in the
individual case, leaving the factual question of whether the child
has been emancipated for a jury to decide.164 The common law
fails, however, to define the specific circumstances in which emanci-
pation will be found.
Emancipation provides several benefits for juveniles who have
trouble living with their parents. It allows older juveniles to legally
live independently, free of parental control. Emancipation also al-
lows juveniles to sign contracts, consent to medical treatment, and
obtain an abortion, without parental consent. '6 5 Perhaps the main
benefit for runaways is that emancipation takes the issue out of the
courts and makes it possible for juveniles to begin building an adult
life for themselves.16 6 Emancipation prevents or removes the
stigma associated with the label "status offender" or "dependent or
neglected child."
Legal adulthood could also extend to the criminal justice sys-
tem.I6 7 This may benefit juveniles who commit minor offenses be-
cause adults receive dispositions according to the culpability of
their actions and juveniles receive dispositions based on their need
for rehabilitation.168 This difference in theory of disposition results
in juveniles actually receiving longer sentences for the same
crimes.169 The adult system also provides for greater procedural
safeguards.170
Emancipation does, however, have certain drawbacks for the
child. Termination of parental rights carries with it a termination
of parental responsibilities. In most states, parents are not finan-
cially responsible for their emancipated children.171 If the child
164. In re Fiihr, 184 N.W.2d 22, 25 (1971).
165. See, e.g., supra note 161.
166. See Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 160, at 246. An unemancipated minor
living independently can be repeatedly brought back to juvenile court on charges of
running away from home. Id. Emancipation can make the juvenile's existing living
situation legal. Id.
167. There are no constitutional barriers to prosecuting children in the adult sys-
tem. See generally Ainsworth, supra note 50.
168. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
169. For example, a 17 year old juvenile may be sentenced to one year in a juve-
nile detention facility for shoplifting if the judge thinks the juvenile needs a year of
rehabilitation. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. An adult, however,
could receive a maximum sentence of 90 days in jail for shoplifting. MiNN. STAT.
§ 609.52 subd. 3(5) (1992).
170. See Smith, supra note 73, at 256-58.
171. See, e.g., CAL. FAm. CODE § 7050(a) (stating "[a]n emancipated minor shall be
considered as being an adult for the following purposes: (a) The minor's right to sup-
port by the minor's parents); In re Sonnenberg, 99 N.W.2d 444, 447 (Minn. 1959)
("[E]mancipation necessarily carries with it the implication that the minor has
reached an age where in some substantial degree he is possessed of the capacity to
earn wages and manage his own affairs.").
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does not gain employment or other support, General Assistance
often provides the only source of income for the child.172 Some par-
ents use the option of emancipation to pressure their minor child
into financial independence. 17 3 Emancipation should be a last re-
sort for a juvenile unable to live at home, not an option for parents
who want to save money.
An ideal emancipation statute would allow juveniles to be-
come independent, while at the same time preventing parents from
using it as a way to relieve themselves of financial responsibility.
Michigan has such a statute.174 The Michigan statute requires the
parents of emancipated juveniles to financially support the minor,
but the parents are not liable for debts incurred by the minor.17 5
Due to the serious nature and consequences of emancipation, it
should be available only as a last resort. Emancipation, however,
provides a good option for juveniles who are unable to live in a trou-
bled home and have exhausted other available remedies.176 Pas-
sage, amendment and increased use of more ideal emancipation
statutes furthers the juvenile justice system's efforts of reform.
C. Due Process Rights
The courts could aid in reforming the juvenile justice system
by according full due process rights to status offenders. 177 With the
passage of the "valid court order" amendment to the JJDPA, judges
now incarcerate status offenders for non-criminal behavior. The
Gault Court recognized that juvenile detention facilities punish
more than rehabilitate.17 8 Yet, status offenders may be sent to
such facilities, even though they formally are "children in need of
protection," and have committed no crime.
A denial of due process rights on this basis subverts the
Court's reasoning in Gault. The Court in Gault found that the dis-
positions received by juveniles substantially resemble dispositions
172. In Minnesota, emancipated juveniles are eligible to receive general assist-
ance if they meet the statutory definition of "legally emancipated." MINN. STAT.
§ 256D.05 subd. 1(10) (1993).
173. See Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 160, at 278.
174. MICH. COMP. LAws § 722.4e(2) (1992).
175. "The parents of a minor emancipated by court order are jointly and severally
obligated to support the minor. However, the parents of a minor emancipated by
court order are not liable for any debts incurred by the minor during the period of
emancipation." Id.
176. Ideally, a court would emancipate a juvenile only after the juvenile's family
had attempted to remain together through participation in counseling, mediation, or
other social services. See Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 160, at 344-47.
177. See generally Smith, supra note 73.
178. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
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received by adults in the criminal system.179 Consequently,
juveniles deserve most of the same procedural protections adults
receive.180 Status offenders also face incarceration like delinquent
juveniles and adults. Thus the reasoning in Gault applies equally
to status offenders and suggests that courts should also award sta-
tus offenders the full panoply of due process rights.
Due process rights decrease judicial discretion, making it
more likely that females and males are treated equally and fairly.
Status offenders deserve all the protections afforded adult defend-
ants. Giving status offenders the right to be found "guilty" beyond a
reasonable doubt and a mandatory, non-waivable right to counsel
would be a step toward forcing the real issues of the juvenile's be-
havior out into the open. If every juvenile had legal representation
in court, there would be a greater chance that all of the other consti-
tutional rights of the juvenile would be protected. 181 With no repre-
sentation, it is unrealistic to expect that most juveniles will even be
aware of their rights, much less be able to adequately assert them.
With an attorney present, the juvenile has a better chance that her
constitutional rights will be asserted.'8 2 With this kind of formal
protection, it is more difficult to punish a girl for being sexually ac-
tive, under the guise of "running away from home."
Conclusion
Enactment of a law allowing out-of-home placement of
juveniles as a consequence for running away from home or truancy
is only logical if the goal of the placement is to protect the child
from dangers on the street. Yet, the "valid court order" amendment
179. Id. "The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a 'receiving
home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which
the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time." Id.
180. Id. at 27-28.
181. Fox, supra note 46, at 1236 ("The granting of procedural rights can hardly
become a reality for children without lawyers to assert them on their behalf.").
182. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 38.
[N]o single action holds more potential for achieving procedural justice
for the child in the juvenile court than provision of counsel. The pres-
ence of an independent legal representative of the child, or of his par-
ent, is the keystone of the whole structure of guarantees that a
minimum system of procedural justice requires. The rights to confront
one's accusers, to cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence and tes-
timony of one's own, to be unaffected by prejudicial and unreliable evi-
dence, to participate meaningfully in the dispositional decision, to take
an appeal have substantial meaning for the overwhelming majority of
persons brought before the juvenile court only if they are provided with
competent lawyers who can invoke those rights effectively.
Id. at 38 n.65. (quoting Report by the President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and
Admin. of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, at 86-87 (1967) (known
as Nat'l Crime Comm'n Report)).
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to the JJDPA was largely the result of paternalistic and punitive
goals of Congress and the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges.
The punitive aspect of the 1980 amendment to the JJDPA is
disturbing in light of the fact that status offenders do not have due
process rights. There is currently a tension in the juvenile justice
system between rehabilitation and punishment. Courts have come
to realize that the juvenile system is in reality punitive. At the
same time, many courts have tried to retain the traditional rehabil-
itative goals, especially when status offenders are affected. This
has led to a situation in which status offenders are not afforded due
process rights, but are still incarcerated. Status offenders continue
to receive the worst of both worlds.
The "valid court order" amendment was also enacted, in part,
as an attempt to control female sexual behavior. Laws criminaliz-
ing fornication, adultery, abortion, and statutory rape have been
used throughout history to restrict female sexuality. This amend-
ment, although more subtle, is equally useful in discriminatorily
controlling female sexual behavior.
This amendment has resulted in continued gender bias in the
dispositions of status offenders. The amendment grants judges the
discretion to sentence status offenders according to their own per-
sonal values. Since the enactment of this amendment, judges may
incarcerate female status offenders to restrict their sexuality, and
at the same time ignore male sexual behavior. Parents also contrib-
ute to the gender bias by referring female juveniles to juvenile court
for sexual behavior, while ignoring similar behavior in male
juveniles.
A first step toward ending this bias would be to remove some
of the discretion afforded juvenile court judges by repealing the
"valid court order" amendment. Repeal of this amendment would
require courts to deal with status offenders in ways other than
sending them to detention facilities.1 83 Laws concerning emancipa-
tion and due process rights would also provide additional security
for juveniles. These measures would begin to ensure that female
juveniles are treated fairly in the juvenile court system.
183. One possibility is that courts would develop better social service programs to
help juveniles remain at home. Discussion of such programs is beyond the scope of
this article.
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